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will not prejudice the absent parties. 33 Sup. Ct. xxix (1912), 28 U.S.C.A. 21, 132-43
(1928). See Californiav. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229, 256 (r895). Furthermore,
to require the Postmaster General's staff to keep track of all suits attacking fraud
orders brought against local postmasters and to provide adequate defense in these
suits would be to impose some inconvenience and expense. But this inconvenience is
not very great; rather it is much less than the inconvenience of defending minor
officers who are attempting to enforce allegedly unconstitutional laws. See 3 U.S.L.W.
1237 (Aug. i8, 1936) (2000 suits brought against collectors of AAA processing taxes).
And the requirement that the Postmaster General be joined would practically destroy
the right to attack postal rulings in most cases because the suits would have to be
brought in Washington, D. C., in order to get service on the Postmaster General.
Wheeler v. Farley, 7 F. Supp. 433 (Cal. i934). The difficulties of intervention by the
Postmaster General with a local United States Attorney as counsel are slight compared with the difficulties and expenses of the citizen, unacquainted with lawyers in
the District of Columbia, in filing suit and proving his case in Washington. The reason which Judge Hand reluctantly tendered for his decision, that a subordinate official
might be unnecessarily bewildered by a "cross-fire" of conflicting orders from his
superior and the courts in his own and other circuits, is admittedly unconvincing.
The subordinate may obey his superior until a conflicting court order is directed toward him, and thereafter must obey the court. The only serious practical consideration for decision in these cases is the desirability of limiting the number of cases in
which the Postmaster General will have to justify his rulings before a court. Though
the injury may be slight in most of these cases and the threat of bureaucracy remote,
it will be best in the long run to preserve a simple and efficient remedy for the citizen
by discarding the rule applied in the National Conference case, or by passing a venue
and process statute enabling a plaintiff to join a superior federal officer in any federal
court and obtain personal service on him in Washington.
Right of Privacy-Publication of Picture in Newsreel as Trade Purpose-[New
York].-The plaintiff's picture, taken while she was exercising in a gymnasium with
other stout women, appeared in the defendant's newsreel. She sued under § 51 of
the New York Civil Rights Law providing: "Any person whose name, portrait or
picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade
.... may .... sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of such
use .... " Cahill's N. Y. Cons. L. 1930, c. 7, § 5I. Held, for the defendant. Publication of matters of public interest is not a trade purpose within the meaning of the
statute. Sweenek v. Pathe News, i6 F. Supp. 746 (N.Y. 1936).
The New York statute, protecting individuals from invasions of their privacy for
advertising or trade purposes, has neither flooded the courts with litigation nor given
them particular difficulty in defining the scope of this protection. Traditional arguments for and against the recognition of a right of privacy failed to distinguish among
the types of cases in which protection might be sought within this category. See Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (i8go); Hadley, The
Right to Privacy, 3 Northwestern L. Rev. 1 (1894). Common law courts have not
drawn a distinction between advertising and other cases but have either refused to
recognize any right of privacy or have extended protection on more general grounds.
See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., I71 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) (lack of
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precedent and fear of burdensome litigation relied upon to deny recovery); Henry v.
Cherry & Webb, 3o R.I. 13, 73 Adt. 97 (199o) (same broad language and recovery
refused even though plaintiff's picture was used for advertising purposes); Atkinson v.
Doherty, i21 Mich. 372, 8o N.W. 285 (1899) (plaintiff refused an injunction where
deceased husband's name and picture were used to advertise defendant's product).
But see Pavesich v. New Eng. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19o, 50 S.E. 68 (i9o5) (plaintiff
recovered for unauthorized use of his picture in defendant's advertisement); Kunz V.
Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918) (another advertising case in which plaintiff
recovered); Foster-MilburnCo. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909) (plaintiff
recovered for unauthorized use of his name as endorsement of defendant'S product).
Cf. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (plaintiff recovered for defendant's placarding him as a debtor-not an advertising case); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker,
I5 La.479,39 So.499 (1905) (police inspector enjoined from placing innocent plaintiff's
picture in rogue's gallery); Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194
(193o) (plaintiff recovered for publication of picture of his deceased deformed child).
Probably the most cogent argument against the recognition of any right of privacy
is that such recognition will endanger the freedom of the press. See Hillnman v. Star
Publishing Co., 64 Wash. 691, 117 Pac. 594 (i9ii). But this freedom extends only
to the dissemination of matters of public interest, and the experience of New York
courts has shown that such matters are easily distinguishable from advertising. See
Jeffries v. N. Y. Evening Journal, 67 Misc. 570, 124 N.Y.S. 780 (191o); Moser v. Press
Pub. Co., 59 Misc. 78, 1o9 N.Y.S. 963 (i9o8). And these courts have construed the
phrase "purposes of trade" as applying only to the sale or publication of matters not of
public interest. Humiston v. Universal Film Co., i89 App. Div. 4 C7, 178 N.Y.S. 752
(1919); Colyer v. Fox, 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N.Y.S. 999 (914); cf. Binns v. Vitagraph
Co., 21o N.Y. 51, 1O3 N.E. i1o8 (1913); Blumenthal v. PictureClassics, 235 App. Div.
570, 257 N.Y.S. 8oo (1932). On the other hand where the plaintiff's picture or name
has been used in a publication for advertising purposes, he has been allowed to recover.
Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, 139 Misc. 290, 248 N.Y.S. 359 (193I); D'Altomonte v. N. Y. Herald, 154 App. Div. 453, 139 N.Y.S. 200 (1913); Eliot v. Jones, 66
Misc. 95, 120 N.Y.S. 989 (IgIo).
Finally, the threat of unduly burdensome litigation has not been borne out. In the
thirty-three years since the statute was passed, New York courts have been obliged to
decide some twenty-odd cases. In view of the more clearly-defined need for protection
of a right of privacy in advertising and trade purpose cases and of its demonstrated
ease of application, the way for legislative or judicial action in other states seems free
from the preconceived difficulties of the older cases.
Torts-Death Statutes-Liability of Telephone Company for Failure in Service[New York].-Unable to obtain a response from the central operator of the defendant
company, the plaintiff, a subscriber, was delayed in reaching his physician in attendance upon his sick child. The child died. Alleging that the child would not have died
it there had been no delay, plaintiff sued under the Decedent Estate Law (Cahill's
N.Y. Cons. L. 1930, c. 13, art. 5), which provides that the next of kin of a decedent
has a cause of action for wrongful death against the one who "would have been liable
to an action in favor of the decedent by reason thereof if death had not ensued."

